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ALLIGATORS FOR CHRISTMAS: LIABILITY FOR WILD ANIMALS IN
THE CONTEXT OF PRIVATE NUISANCE
T. Alexandra Parker*
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, alligators terrorized Tom and Consandra Christmas of Wilkinson
County, Mississippi. When the Christmases moved to a large tract of land
located between Centreville and Woodville, Mississippi, the couple made plans
to build a life there; they dreamt of constructing a house and having a pond.
They dreamt of having a place where they could fish and host their
grandchildren. That dream ended, however, when the Christmases realized that
situated next to their property was an alligator-infested toxic waste dump owned
by Exxon Mobil ("Exxon"). Soon, the Christmases were too afraid to use their
property, and their dream of having a peaceful retreat came to an abrupt halt. In
an effort to salvage their dream and the use of their property, the Christmases
turned to the legal system for help-claiming private nuisance against Exxon.
In Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi addressed the following question: can a person be held liable in
private nuisance for the presence of alligators on his property? Responding to
that question, the majority repeatedly asserted that because the alligators on
Exxon's property were "wild," the corporation could not be held liable in private
nuisance. This Note analyzes the term "wild" to determine the meaning of the
word in the context of private nuisance and discusses the difference between
wildness and possession. Then, this Note looks to cases from other jurisdictions
that deal with liability in private nuisance for the possession of wild animals and
compares those cases and rulings to the instant case. Last, this Note proposes a
more structured approach to private nuisance cases that courts should apply in
the future when similar issues arise.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From the early 1980s until the early 2000s, Cliff Rogers owned a landfill in
the countryside of Wilkinson County, Mississippi.' For most of that time period,
Exxon Mobil used Rogers' landfill exclusively and helped him keep the landfill
functioning. 2 One of Rogers' former employees, Frederick Coleman, testified
that while Rogers owned the property, Exxon controlled and made all decisions
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Mississippi College School of Law. The author would first like to thank
her family and friends for their constant encouragement and support. Specifically, she would like to thank her
father, who first introduced her to the Christmases and their story. She would also like to thank Professor
Campbell for his direction and feedback throughout the writing process.
1. Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 138 So. 3d 123, 125 (Miss. 2014).
2. Id.
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regarding the site. 3 In addition to the landfill, the property featured nineteen
ponds, amounting to eighty-five surface acres, which Rogers used to collect
4
rainwater.
During the early 1980s, Rogers purportedly introduced alligators from
Louisiana to the property. 5 Coleman testified that while he was working at the
landfill, he watched an instructional video explaining that Rogers brought the
alligators, as well as other kinds of animals, to the landfill so that he could
monitor their health to determine whether the site was safe for humans. 6
Coleman stated that some. landfill employees were responsible for maintaining
these animals; the employees were instructed to feed the animals and house some
of the alligators in a shed. 7
After years of using and controlling the landfill, Exxon finally bought the
property from Rogers during the summer of 2001.8 About a year and a half
later, Tom and Consandra Christmas bought thirty-five acres of land adjacent to
the landfill. 9 During the next four years, the Christmases spotted several
alligators on their land. 10 Mr. and Mrs. Christmas both testified that they were
scared to go outside because of the alligators, and Mr. Christmas blamed the
alligators for the loss of three of his animals-a pet dog and two cows.II The
couple maintains that they first learned of Exxon's alligator infestation and toxic
waste dump in 2007, when Mr. Christmas followed a pet onto the property.12
Within the same year, the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and
Parks found approximately eighty-four alligators on the Exxon property, which it
determined to be a high population of wild alligators for that area of land. 13 The
next summer, Exxon arranged for the Department to remove and relocate some
of the alligators. 14
On August 11, 2008, the Christmases filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Wilkinson County against Exxon for nuisance and requested monetary damages
for having to live next to the alligator-infested property.15 Despite the
Christmases' argument that the presence of the alligators caused their property
value to decline, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon,
which argued that the Christmases could not prove damages and that the statute
of limitations barred them from bringing suit. 16 The Christmases appealed the
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Id. at 129 (Chandler, J., dissenting).
Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 138 So. 3d 168, 170 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 138 So. 3d 123, 125 (Miss. 2014).
Id. at 129 (Chandler, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 125 (majority opinion).
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decision. 17 The court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations
depended on when the Christmases first learned of Exxon's alligator problem. 18
Finding the timing of the Christmases' knowledge of the infestation to be in
dispute, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, which prompted
Exxon's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. 19
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted summary judgment in
favor of Exxon. 20 The court held that Exxon could not be held liable in private
nuisance because there was no evidence that Exxon took possession of the
alligators. 2 1 The court justified its determination, explaining, "[A]llowing wild
alligators to constitute a private nuisance would'22subject landowners to liability
for something over which they have no control."
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
In Mississippi, the case of Bowen v. Flahertydefines private nuisance as, "a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of his
property. One landowner may not use his land so as to unreasonably annoy,
inconvenience, or harm others."'2 3 In Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v.
Ferguson, the Supreme Court of Mississippi expounded on the concept of
private nuisance, explaining the two types of nuisance that Mississippi
recognizes:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is
a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b)
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for
negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or
24
activities.
In A/fred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockerv, the court clarified, "Each case must
be decided upon its own peculiar facts, taking into consideration the location and
the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary that other property owners
of life
should be driven from their dwellings. It is enough that the enjoyment
25
annoying."
and
uncomfortable
materially
rendered
is
property
and
A. Intentional and UnreasonableNuisance
The first kind of nuisance, as discussed in Comet Delta, is one that is
intentional and unreasonable, one that involves "an intentional act involving a

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 128.
21. Id. at 127-28.
22. Id. at 127.
23. Bowen v. Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860, 862 (Miss. 1992).
24. Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 662 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Comet
Delta, Inc. v. Pate Stevedore Co. of Pascagoula, Inc., 521 So. 2d 857, 859-60 (Miss. 1988)).
25. Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 139 So. 2d 632, 634 (Miss. 1962).
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culpable wrong." 2 6 The case of Lambert v. Matthews is an example of an
intentional and unreasonable nuisance in Mississippi. In that case, the defendant
owned around 100 roosters and chickens that he kept in 200 small structures on
his property. 2 7 The plaintiffs complained that the roosters' constant crowing
interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property and accordingly, filed
suit against the defendant, claiming private nuisance. 28 The Court of Appeals of
Mississippi found that the number of crowing roosters on the defendant's
property was unreasonable, and because the defendant raised the birds as a
hobby (rather than for income) the court required him to reduce his bird
population to no more than two. 29
A'fred JacobshagenCo. is another Mississippi case that involves the issue
of intentional and unreasonable private nuisance. There, the defendant operated
a plant that dismantled and cooked animal carcasses. 30 As a result of those
operations, the plant "emitted into the air obnoxious, nauseous, sickening, and
offensive odors and fumes ....
",31 The plaintiffs, who were neighboring
property owners, complained that the odor prevented them from eating and
sleeping. 3 2 The chancery court found that the plant lacked the proper
mechanisms to prevent water and power failures that often resulted in the
tremendously disgusting odors. 3 3 The court held: "A reasonable use of one's
property cannot be construed to include those uses which produce obnoxious
smells, which in turn result in a material injury to owners of property in the
vicinity, causing them to suffer substantial annoyance, inconvenience, and
discomfort. ' 34 Because of the defendant's unreasonable use of his property, the
court found him liable for private nuisance and required him to make
improvements to his plant in order to eliminate the terrible smell. 35
B. Unintentionaland Otherwise Actionable Nuisance

The second type of nuisance in Mississippi is conduct that can be
simultaneously characterized as negligence. According to Patterson v. Liberty
Associates, L.P., "[t]he elements of a negligence action are well-settled in
Mississippi. A plaintiff in a negligence suit must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) injury."' 3 6 In
order for conduct to amount to the second type of nuisance, all four elements of
negligence must be met.
One example of this kind of nuisance is portrayed White v. Lewis. In that
26.
27.
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29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Comet Delta, Inc. v. Pate Stevedore Co. of Pascagoula, Inc., 521 So. 2d 857, 858 (Miss. 1988).
Lambert v. Matthews, 757 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1070.
Alfred Jacobshagen Co., 139 So. 2d at 632.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Patterson v. Liberty Associates, L.P., 910 So. 2d 1014, 1019 (Miss. 2004).
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case, the defendant owned animals, including dogs, turkeys, hogs, and chickens,
that often wandered onto the plaintiffs' property. 37 The animals also made
excessive noise and scattered garbage along the property line between the
parties' land. 38 The Supreme Court of Mississippi determined that "[i]t is not
necessary to debate whether dogs and chickens may attain the status of
It is enough that their presence and actions created a
trespassers.
nuisance

..

.,39

Other jurisdictions have also addressed the issue of nuisance in the context
of wild animals. In Sickman v. United States, the Seventh Circuit considered
whether a person could be liable for trespassing wild animals. 40 In that case, the
plaintiffs owned farms near a wildlife preserve in Illinois.4 1 After suffering
damage to their corn and soybean crops, the plaintiffs sued the United States,
claiming that it failed to protect the plaintiffs' farms from the migratory geese
that occupied the wildlife preserve during the winter. 4 2 The Seventh Circuit held
in favor of the government, finding that "a private person could not be held
liable for the trespasses of animals which areferaenaturae,and which have not
been reduced to possession, but which exist in a state of nature." 4 3 The court
continued, "The United States, considered as a private person, did not have any
ownership, control or possession of these wild geese which imposed liability for
44
their trespasses."
Similarly, in 1961, the Appellate Court of Illinois determined whether an
individual may be held liable for private nuisance for naturally occurring insects.
In Merriam v. McConnell, the plaintiff sued his neighbors, the defendants, on the
basis of private nuisance because the defendants had a certain type of tree on
their property that attracted box elder bugs. 45 The bugs infested the plaintiffs
house, ruining his furniture. 4 6 The court found for the defendants, relying on the
following language from a nuisance treatise:
In order to create a legal nuisance, the act of man must have
contributed to its existence ....[A] nuisance cannot arise from

the neglect of one to remove that which exists or arises from
purely natural causes. But, when the result is traceable to
artificial causes, or where the hand of man, in any essential
measure, contributed thereto, the person committing the
wrongful act cannot excuse himself from liability upon the
ground that natural causes conspired with his act to produce the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

White v. Lewis, 57 So. 2d 497, 498 (Miss 1952).
Id.
Id.
Siekman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1950).
M.
Id.
Id. at 618.
Id.
Merriam v. McConnell, 175 N.E. 2d 293,294 (11.Ct. App. 1961).
Id.
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ill results. 47
The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed a similar issue in Roberts v.
Brewer. In Roberts, the plaintiffs sued the defendant after a group of beavers
built a dam across a creek on the defendant's property, causing water to back up
onto the plaintiffs property. 4 8 Despite the plaintiffs' complaints, the defendant
refused to remove the dam. 4 9 Because of the blockage, the plaintiffs' property
flooded with stagnant water and became a breeding ground for mosquitos.5 0 The
Supreme Court of Alabama held that while the plaintiff suffered actual injury,
the defendant was not legally liable for the presence of the dam.5 1 Instead, the
court allowed the plaintiffs to remove the dam, even though the beavers would
likely rebuild the dam after it was destroyed.5 2
In 1979, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided the case of
Commonwealth v. Sadecky, in which the defendant maintained a rat-infested
junkyard, contrary to an ordinance.5 3 There, the defendant used his property to
store pieces of old cars and boats.5 4 The defendant's maintenance of the
junkyard led to a rodent infestation on his property, creating hazardous
conditions for the citizens of the boroughSS
The court found that the
defendant's storage of old vehicles constituted a nuisance and declared that "[a]
haven for rodents is a nuisance in fact."5' 6
More recently,, in 2005, the plaintiffs in Butler v. City of Palos Verdes
Estates (as residents of the defendant city) sued the city on several grounds,
including private nuisance, after becoming frustrated with the city's growing
peacock population.5 7 Years before the lawsuit, one of the city's former mayors
brought several peacocks to his home and kept them outside in an enclosure.5 8
When the mayor died, his family released the birds into the wild.5 9 After the
release of the birds in 1965, the city developed a substantial peacock
population. 60 The court found that the city was not responsible for the peacocks
because the peacocks were living in the wild. 6 1 In reaching that decision, the
court relied on the fact that the city did not feed, protect, or breed the birds. 62
The court noted that even though the original six to eight peacocks brought over

47. Id.at 296 (quoting I H.G.WOOD, NUISANCES 148-49 (3d cd. 1983)).
48. Roberts v. Brewer, 276 So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Ala. 1973).
49. Id. at 576-77.
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id. at 582.
52. Id. at 581.
53. Commonwealth v. Sadccky, 398 A.2d 1073, 1074-75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
54. Id. at 1075.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Butler v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
58. Id. at201.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 208.
62. Id. at 205.
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by the mayor may have been domesticated birds, the peacocks currently
63
occupying the city were not.
Last, in the 2008 case of Belhumeur v. Zilm, the plaintiff was attacked and
injured by wild bees that had nested in one of the defendants' trees. 64 The
plaintiff claimed that the bees amounted to a private nuisance because the
defendants, by allowing the bees to reside on their property, were interfering
with his right to use and enjoy his property. 6 5 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire rejected the plaintiff's claim, finding that "the defendants could not
be held liable in nuisance 'for wild animals that exist on their land as a natural
occurrence.' 66 The court held that because the defendants did not contribute to
the bees' presence or nesting, the bees were naturally occurring and could not
67
constitute a private nuisance.
IV. INSTANT CASE

A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Lamar explained that the issue in the
instant case was whether the presence of wild alligators could be a private
nuisance. 6 8 First, the court explained that Exxon did not bring the alligators onto
the land and did not seem to be purposely keeping them there. 69 Rather, Rogers
allegedly brought the alligators onto the property before he sold the land to
Exxon. 70 But even if Rogers did introduce alligators to the property, the
majority found that there was no evidence to show any biological relationship
between Rogers' alligators and the current overpopulation of alligators on the
the source of the alligator
land. 7 1 The majority also noted that if Rogers was
72
actions.
his
for
liable
be
not
problem, Exxon should
Because the issue in this case was an issue of first impression for
Mississippi, the court looked to a case from Alabama, Sickman v. United States,
73
and a case from Seventh Circuit, Roberts v. Brewer, as persuasive authority.
The majority concluded that in these jurisdictions, "private persons cannot be
held liable for the acts of wild animals on their property that are not reduced to
possession."'74 The court adopted this view as its own and then turned to the law
of Mississippi, explaining that only the Mississippi Department of Wildlife,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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74.

Id.
Belhumeur v. Zilm, 949 A.2d 162, 163 (N.H. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 138 So. 3d 123, 126 (Miss. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fisheries, and Parks may manage wild alligators. 75 Noting that the Department
alone controls all activities involving alligators, including buying, selling,
capturing, and removing the reptiles, the majority concluded that Exxon's only
option was to ask the Department to remove some of the alligators on the
property. 7 6 Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon,
holding that because Exxon did not possess the alligators, the animals were wild
and could not be a private nuisance. 77
B. The Dissenting Opinion

In the dissenting opinion, Justice Chandler, joined by Justices Randolph,
Kitchens, and King, began by laying out the governing rules. The dissent noted
that when considering Exxon's motion for summary judgment, the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Christmases, as the
nonmoving party. 78 The dissent found that a genuine issue of material fact
existed in regard to whether the alligators were in Exxon's possession and could
classify as a private nuisance or whether they were naturally occurring. 79 Justice
Chandler then discussed the concept of private nuisance, first defining private
nuisance and then explaining that permanent private nuisances may result in
lower property values, while temporary private nuisances may not. 80
Moving into its analysis of the case at hand, the dissent first clarified that
when private individuals place wild animals on property where the animals do
not otherwise appear naturally, those individuals may incur liability for private
nuisance. 8 1 The dissent referenced Commonwealth v. Sadecky, a Pennsylvania
case that held that a "haven for rodents is a nuisance in fact."'82 Finding that the
evidence, particularly Coleman's affidavit, suggested that the alligators'
presence on the land was unnatural, the dissent found that there was reason to
believe that the alligators on Exxon's property did not naturally occur there. 8 3
Because of this possible inference, the dissent asserted that the majority failed to
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the Christmases. 84
Second, Justice Chandler found that a genuine dispute as to a material fact
existed over whether the alligator infestation amounted to a nuisance. 85 Noting
that while the Christmases never saw any alligators enter their property from the
neighboring landfill, the dissent revealed that Mr. Christmas did see an alligator
attempt to crawl under his fence, and Coleman did actually see alligators escape

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id. (Chandler, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 129.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sadecky, 398 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979)).
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
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through the Christmases' fence. 86 Coupled with this evidence, the dissent
concluded that the alligator infestation could be a private nuisance because of the
Christmases' inability to use and enjoy their land. 8 7 The dissent based this
conclusion on evidence that the Christmases were too scared of the alligators to
go outside and go near their ponds, along with evidence that alligators were
88
responsible for the couple's loss of three animals.
Justice Chandler summarized the dissenting opinion by concluding that,
[i]f a landowner, in violation of Mississippi law, amassed wild alligators or
lured them to his or her property, those alligators could not be said to exist in a
state of nature, and the landowner could be liable for creating and maintaining a
nuisance." 89 Finding that the majority failed to view the evidence in a way that
favored the Christmases, as the nonmoving party, Justice Chandler held that he
would remand the case for trial. 9 0
V. ANALYSIS

In the instant case, the majority repeatedly used the term "wild" in
reference to the alligators as a way of bolstering its position that the alligators
were not in captivity. However, a closer inspection of the term "wild" in the
context of private nuisance reveals that the majority used the term incorrectly
throughout, confusing the concepts of "wildness" and "possession." When
looking to cases from other jurisdictions, it is clear that wildness and possession
have separate and distinct meanings because in the concept of private nuisance,
possession of a wild animal is what sparks a duty.
In addition, as previously established, Mississippi recognizes two kinds of
private nuisance. The first kind is an intentional and unreasonable invasion of
another's use and enjoyment of his property. The second kind is essentially a
claim for negligence, requiring duty, breach, causation, and injury. In the instant
case, however, the majority failed to thoroughly analyze the facts of the case
under both kinds of nuisance. Instead, the majority only briefly discussed the
role of possession in private nuisance and glazed over the facts of the case. And
while the dissent focused more on the elements of negligence and the facts in the
record, both opinions failed to give adequate analyses of the issue at hand.
A. The Difference Between Wildness and Possession

Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Lamar emphasizes the word
"wild" in reference to the alligators. She says, "We find the dispositive issue in
this case is whether the presence of wild alligators can constitute a private
nuisance." 9 1 She also announces, "At the outset, we find it important to clarify
that this is a wild-alligator case. There is no evidence that Exxon brought the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
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alligators to its property or that it is restraining the alligators in any way." 92
Toward the end of the opinion, again, she says, "Consequently, allowing wild
alligators to constitute a private nuisance would subject landowners to liability
for something over which they have no control. '93 But what exactly makes an
alligator "wild?"
American Law Reports specifies that the term "wild animal" includes
"animals of known savage nature, living ordinarily at large and not by custom
devoted to the service of mankind... ."94 This definition supports the
conclusion that an animal is inherently wild and that its classification as "wild"
will not disappear -if the animal is suddenly confined to a cage or put on a leash.
According to the American Law Reports' definition, an alligator would classify
as an immutably wild animal because it is vicious and unfit for interaction with
humans, let alone service.
Similarly, the Mississippi Judicial College's
definition is as follows:
A wild animal is an animal that is not usually domesticated or
that is not customarily used by people. A person who owns or
keeps a wild animal is legally responsible for the harm that the
wild animal causes to others, even if the owner carefully keeps
the wild animal and does not know that the particular wild
animal is dangerous. 95
Like the definition from American Law Reports, this definition also
indicates that an animal's categorization as "wild" is inflexible. A particular
animal, by its nature, is either wild or it is not. Again, using the Mississippi
Judicial College's definition of wild animal, an alligator, as an animal that is not
typically domesticated, would classify as wild.
Another underlying aspect of the instant case deals with the definition of
possession when wild animals are at issue. In Pierson v. Post, the court held that
the animal in question-a fox-was a wild animal, and the only way for a person
to claim ownership to a wild animal is through occupancy. 96 Occupancy, the
court determined, can be defined as "actual corporal possession" of the animal,
which includes keeping the animal in an enclosure or net, or can be defined as
the mortal wounding of the animal with the intent to take possession of it. 97
Under Pierson, the key to the possession of a wild animal is denial of the
animal's liberty. 9 8 So under Pierson,if a person confines an alligator, which is
inherently wild, to a cage, captures it in a net, or mortally wounds it, that person
has taken possession of that alligator. Taking the Pierson definition of

92.
93.
94.
Animal, 21
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 127.
E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Owner or Keeper's Liabilityfor PersonalInjury or Death Inflicted by Wild
A.L.R. 3d 603 (1968).
Miss. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIV. § 3100 (2014).
Picrson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178-79.
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possession in conjunction with the American Law Reports and Mississippi
Judicial College's definitions of wild, an animal can be both wild and possessed;
if a human places an alligator in some kind of enclosure, the alligator maintains
its wild character despite its state of captivity.
The concepts of wildness and possession come up repeatedly throughout
the majority opinion of the instant case. But the majority seems to have muddled
the two terms from the very beginning of the opinion; Justice Lamar starts by
declaring the case to be a "wild-alligator case" on the basis that Exxon did not
have possession of the alligators. 99 In reality, that supposedly important
clarification clarified nothing at all. The majority treats wildness and possession
as mutually exclusive ideas, incorrectly using the word "wild" to mean "free" or
"not possessed." The instant case is, however, a wild-alligator case not because
the alligators were or were not being held captive on Exxon's property, but
because alligators are inherently and unchangeably wild.
B. The Link Between Possession and Duty: How PossessionAmounts to Duty
In order to constitute the second kind of private nuisance, there must be
negligence, and all four elements of negligence must be met. The first element
of negligence is duty, so in order for a person to be liable for private nuisance, he
must have first had a duty. When addressing wild animals in the context of
private nuisance, courts have found that possession of a wild animal can be key
to establishing a duty.
White v. Lewis is one Mississippi case that dealt with the issue of
negligence in the context of private nuisance. In White, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held the defendant liable in nuisance when his animals annoyed the
neighboring plaintiffs by making too much noise. 100 In order to find nuisance,
the court must have determined that the facts of the case were enough to satisfy
all four elements of negligence. While these elements are not specifically
discussed in the case, they are present. Beginning with the last two elements, the
plaintiffs in this case clearly established injury and causation; the noisy and
rambunctious animals kept the plaintiffs from enjoying their property and using
it to its full potential. As for the first two elements, the court found that the
defendants had a duty to keep their animals from bothering the plaintiffs and
interfering with their property use, and it based that duty on the defendant's
ownership and possession of the animals. Specifically, the court said, "[T]he
coercive power of this extraordinary writ should not encompass those who
neither owned nor controlled the annoying agencies."' 0 1 In other words, the
defendant's possession of the animals sparked the duty to keep those animals
from interfering with the plaintiffs property rights. By allowing the animals to
make excessive noise, the defendant breached that duty.
In Sickman, the Seventh Circuit held that the Government was not liable

99. Christmas v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 138 So. 3d 123, 127 (Miss. 2014).
100. White v. Lewis, 57 So. 2d 497, 498 (Miss 1952).
101. Id.
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when migratory geese destroyed the plaintiffs corn and soybean crops. 10 2
While the court did explain that the plaintiffs brought suit against the
Government, claiming that the geese constituted a nuisance on the basis of
negligence 10 3 , the court did not follow a clear negligence analysis. Rather, the
court indirectly discussed some of the negligence elements. For example, the
court acknowledged that the plaintiffs certainly had an injury; they lost their
crops because of the geese. 104 The court also discussed duty by explaining the
plaintiffs argument-that the Government should have had a duty to keep the
birds away from their corn and soybeans. 10 5 In the end, the court explicitly held
that "[t]he United States, considered as a private person, did not have any
ownership, control, or possession of these wild geese .... ,106 In other words,
without possessing or controlling the birds, no duty existed for the Government
to breach. Further, while the Seventh Circuit made its determination based on
negligence and discussed some of the elements of negligence, its analysis was
unclear.
Likewise, in Merriam v. McConnell, the Illinois Appellate Court found that
the defendants could not be held liable when bugs from their property infested
their neighbor's house. 10 7 The court based its determination on the fact that the
bugs were naturally occurring on the defendants' property; the defendants did
not introduce the bugs to the land and could not be liable for failing to eradicate
them. 10 8 The court found, however, that if the defendants had caused or even
contributed to the bugs' presence on their own property, then they could be held
liable for nuisance. 109 The plaintiffs in Merriam clearly had an injury caused by
the bugs on the defendant's property, but the court could not hold the defendants
liable because they did not possess or contribute to the existence of the bugs.
Without possession or contribution to the bugs, no duty attached. Again, in this
case, the court reached its conclusion based on an incomplete negligence
analysis. The court stated, "[D]efendants have been enjoined, only where a
human agency has intervened in a negligent ... way to turn the natural creation
into a nuisance." l0 Here, finding human intervention was key to finding
negligence because that intervention is what creates a duty.
In Roberts v. Brewer, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to force the
defendant to remove a naturally occurring beaver dam on his property, even
though it was causing flooding and a mosquito infestation on the plaintiffs'
property.'I1 Finding that the defendant was not legally liable for the presence of
the dam, the court gave the plaintiffs permission to go onto the defendant's
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property and remove the dam.1 12 The court certainly recognized that the
plaintiffs had suffered an injury, which was the mosquito infestation and
flooding because of the beavers. But because the defendant had no control over
the beavers and their dam building, the court simply could not hold him liable.
Without possession or control of the beavers, the defendant had no duty to
remove the dam and fix the plaintiffs' problems. Accordingly, the court awarded
the plaintiffs an equitable remedy, which was permission to go onto the
defendant's property and remove the dam. In Roberts, the court only hints at its
consideration of negligence by repeating that the plaintiffs claimed the defendant
was "negligently maintaining" the dam.1 13 And while its analysis certainly
contained elements of negligence, particularly duty and injury, the court did not
explicitly engage in a negligence analysis.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in Sadecky, held the defendant
liable for maintaining a junkyard that became a breeding ground for rats. 114 The
plaintiff, the Commonwealth, claimed that the junkyard was a safety hazard
because it might attract children, and the rats were a health hazard. 115 In that
case, the Commonwealth demonstrated that the injury it suffered was the hazards
the junkyard posed. Because the defendant contributed to the existence of the
rats by maintaining their habitat, he was liable in nuisance. By storing old boats
and cars on his property and attracting the rodents, a duty attached to the
defendant. He breached that duty by allowing the rats to take over his property
and cause the health and safety concerns. The court's eventual conclusion was
that the defendant acted negligently by breaching a duty, but strangely, the court
never mentioned negligence at all.
A California Court of Appeals case made similar links between possession
and liability in Butler v. City of Palos Verdes Estates. The court found that the
city's large population of peacocks was not a private nuisance because the city
did not feed, protect, or breed the birds, even though the birds were originally
brought over and possessed by the city's former mayor. 1 16 In its determination,
the court implied that had the birds been fed, enclosed, bred, or otherwise
possessed, the city could have been held liable for the nuisance that the birds
caused for the city's residents. 117 But because the city did not possess the birds
or contribute to their existence, it had no duty to keep the birds from causing
harm to others. Butler is yet another example of a court employing a negligence
analysis and making conclusions based on negligence without openly doing so.
The court could not hold the city liable for private nuisance because the city was
not negligent, but the court did not make this holding overt.
In Belhumeur v. Zilm, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the
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The court found that the animals were naturally present in the area, and because
the defendants did not cause or contribute to the bees' existence, the bees did not
amount to a private nuisance.11 9 Had the defendants introduced the bees to their
property or helped maintain their habitat, then they could have been held liable
for private nuisance. Again, without possession, contribution, or control, no
duty could attach to the defendant, and without duty, the defendant could not be
liable for the plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
Belhumeur was more explicit than most courts about tying the concepts of
negligence and private nuisance together. In fact, the court discussed the
element of duty outright. The court focused, however, solely on duty. Because
the court did not even mention the other elements, the negligence analysis still
seemed lacking.
In order for conduct to amount to nuisance under the second kind of private
nuisance, it must be "unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent... conduct." 120 All of the aforementioned
cases used some kind of rough negligence analysis, but most of them only
focused on the concept of duty. All of those cases demonstrated that possession
of an animal, and in some jurisdictions, control over an animal or contribution to
an animal's existence, is what sparks the duty. No duty attaches without
possession, control, or contribution. Duty is an essential element that must be
met, and without it, there can be no finding of private nuisance based on
negligence.
C. Negligence in the Instant Case

Although the facts in all of the cases mentioned above included the
elements of negligence, none of the courts actually walked through the
negligence analysis to determine whether the defendant was liable. Even though
negligence has specific elements, not a single court in those cases mentioned all
of them. While the second kind of private nuisance clearly requires a negligence
analysis, courts seem to be lackadaisical in applying the facts of a case to the
elements of negligence. There is a clear link between duty and possession, but
courts are hardly explicit about that connection. In the instant case, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi is no exception.
The majority's analysis in the instant case is incomplete. While the court
does acknowledge the existence of two types of nuisance, it does not fully
address either type. As for the first kind of nuisance, the court does not attempt
to determine whether Exxon's conduct was intentional and unreasonable. And
as for the second kind, the court does not even mention the four elements of
negligence or attempt to apply the facts to those elements. The only element that
the court alludes to is duty, and it does so by admitting that "other jurisdictions
have held that private persons cannot be held liable for the acts of wild animals
on their property that are not reduced to possession."1 2 1 But even in this fleeting
119. Id. at 164.
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discussion of duty, the court relies solely on possession, when many jurisdictions
have imposed a duty on individuals for exhibiting control over a wild animal or
for simply contributing to the existence of a wild animal.
The majority also declines to mention the facts in dispute. As the dissent
points out, the record contains several allegations that Exxon played a significant
role in the alligators' presence on the property. The record indicates that Exxon
and Rogers may have had an agency-type relationship, and Exxon may have had
a hand in importing the alligators from Louisiana. Furthermore, the record also
reveals that Exxon may have been keeping the alligators in enclosures and
feeding them. Instead of acknowledging these discrepancies in the record, the
majority glazes over them, concluding, "[tihere is no evidence that Exxon
brought the alligators to its property or that it is restraining the alligators in any
way."' 122 The court is correct in asserting that when an animal occurs naturally,
an individual cannot be held liable; however, the facts in the instant case are far
from certain. Because of these factual uncertainties, the court should have
withheld summary judgment and sent the case to trial.
Another approach that courts should employ when making private nuisance
analyses is to discuss every element of nuisance (rather than stopping after one)
even if there is doubt surrounding an element. In the instant case, the majority
discussed duty exclusively, and again, it discusses it briefly, incompletely, and in
no express terms. The majority should have meticulously examined the facts of
the case, and even if there was doubt surrounding the existence of duty,
regardless, the court should have gone on to discuss the other three elements of
negligence. A complete negligence analysis is important in cases like the instant
case where the facts are unclear. Because the facts are so uncertain regarding
duty, the majority should have acknowledged them and continued its analysis of
the other three negligence elements. If the court could identify shortcomings
with another element of negligence, it could have bolstered its argument against
a finding of private nuisance instead of relying solely on the duty element to
support its conclusion.
In the instant case, the dissent organized a somewhat more comprehensive
analysis of the facts. The dissent discussed the concept and types of private
nuisance in more detail and relied more on case law to support its position that
when the circumstances surrounding an animal's presence are unnatural, a duty
may attach to the party that has contributed to the animal's existence. In
addition, the dissent discussed the injury element of negligence, noting that the
Christmases could not enjoy their land because they feared the alligators,
especially after losing several of their animals to the reptiles. The dissent also
accurately pointed out the discrepancies in the record. Despite its more
comprehensive approach, the dissent still lacks the structure that a private
nuisance opinion needs. The analysis would have been far more effective if the
dissent had discussed both types of private nuisance, including all of the
elements of negligence, more exhaustively.
As a whole, courts need to be more thorough with their approaches when
122. Id. at 126.
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discussing private nuisance, especially when they rely on negligence as a basis.
Courts should define the two types of nuisance, clearly delineate the elements of
negligence, and apply the facts accordingly. Particularly, when determining
whether a duty exists for an animal's behavior in the context of private nuisance,
courts should carefully examine the parties' conduct. If there are facts that
indicate possession, control, or maintenance of animal, a duty may be present.
This approach is precisely the method that the Supreme Court of Mississippi
should have employed in the instant case. Rather than omitting the elements of
negligence and overlooking the facts in the record, the majority should have
been clearer and more detailed when reaching its conclusion. Without a welldefined analysis, the court's conclusion lacks the clarity and power that it needs
to be convincing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi sought to determine
whether the wild animals on Exxon's property could constitute a private
nuisance. Because Mississippi case law is relatively silent on issues involving
wild animals within the context of private nuisance, the court announced that it
would look to case law from other states to resolve the issue. The court
ultimately determined that the alligators were wild, and therefore could not be a
private nuisance. Upon closer examination, however, case law from other states
shows that wild animals can, under certain circumstances constitute private
nuisance. And part of the problem with the majority opinion is that the majority
repeatedly used the term "wild" incorrectly, confusing the word with the concept
of captivity. But an entirely different problem with the majority opinion is the
court's disregard of the evidence in support of the Christmases. At the very
least, the court should have denied Exxon summary judgment on the matter to
give the parties a chance to present the evidence to a fact-finder.
Regardless of the result, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in the instant
case failed to deliver a well-,organized opinion. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions lacked the structure that a private nuisance analysis needs. The two
opinions needed complete discussions of the two types of private nuisance that
Mississippi recognizes, and more importantly, they needed an outlined analysis
of negligence. The instant case was a perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court
of Mississippi to create a strong and convincing private nuisance opinion as an
example for other courts and for future decisions. But because the court's
structure, analysis, and application fell short, the opinion is weak, and the
conclusion is unpersuasive.

